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Discussion Paper No. 2001/33
Can the Gains from Argentina’s
Utilities Reform Offset Credit Shocks?




Relying on a general equilibrium model of Argentina’s economy calibrated for 1993
and internalizing all productivity and scale gains achieved up to 1999, this paper isolates
the distributional effects of utilities reform from the impact of other reforms taking
place in the country during the 1990s. The analysis shows that both private and public
agents gain from the increases in productivity and in service access made possible by
the utilities reform. In the short term, the public sector benefits from the proceeds of the
sale of firms and the associated debt reduction, but greater advantages in the long term
accumulate from the expanded taxbase and from the reduction in expenditure flows.
Private agents gain from lower costs, lower average tariffs, and improvements in service
quality as well as greater employment opportunities resulting from lower production
costs. These welfare gains, however, are substantially offset by the ‘tequila’ and ‘vodka’
…/…
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JEL classifications: C68, L5shocks that hit the country during the 1990s and increased rationing in the credit
markets. The distributional effects of the utilities reform are generally positive at this
macroeconomic level of analysis, but this often implies a strong commitment to an
effective regulatory regime to prevent capture of the contributions of reform by the
capital owners of the utilities sector.1
1 Introduction
In the early 1990s, Argentina began the transfer of the operations and sometimes the
ownership of infrastructure services to the private sector.1 Since then, performance
indicators clearly show that quality and access have, on average, improved in electricity,
gas, water and sanitation, and telecommunications. However, since 1995, the cost of
Argentina’s external financing has been subject to a series of increases—notably the
‘tequila’ effect and the ‘vodka’ effect resulting from the Mexican and Russian crises,
respectively. The increased costs to its external credit have decelerated the Argentinean
economy and decreased the standard of living for a large portion of the middle- and
lower-income classes. These shocks have also had an impact on the effects of the
utilities reform and have, in many ways, confused the perceived contributions from the
reforms and their distributional influence.
One of the agents commonly ignored in any discussion of the longer-term winners and
losers of the utilities reform is the government, which has benefited in more ways than
is usually acknowledged. The initial financial proceeds and debt reduction resulting
from the privatization transactions are widely recognized. However, improved
efficiency of public expenditure, increased taxbase and additional economic activity
have further, longer-lasting effects which, under certain conditions, may have the
strongest impact in present net value terms. This is not to say that the importance of the
initial shock should be underestimated. Indeed, debt reduction tends to reduce the cost
of borrowing for the government and also for private agents, as the country risk
improves. This factor, however, is difficult to assess and is thus not included in this
study, which means that we may be underestimating the fiscal and macroeconomic
payoffs from the reform. The results are, however, reliable enough to enable us to study
the fiscal distributional impacts of the utilities reform and to highlight the relative social
importance of the various fiscal changes faced by the government.
Since the expenditure and tax implications of reform extend to all activities and all
relative prices, a general equilibrium approach is the most appropriate method of
evaluation. The model presented is a short-term model of a small open economy, trading
goods and financial services internationally, with four main groups of agents: firms
producing goods and services, families classified according to their income group, a
government sector and a foreign sector. With this modelling of workers and consumers,
we can also fully trace the distributional consequences of the fiscal effects of reform.
The method, however, is not perfect: there is a limitation in assessing the shadow value
of the scarce resources available to the public sector in the pre-reform period. Indeed,
since the model is calibrated for today’s economy, several behavioural parameters and
1 The transfer is complete for telecommunications, gas, electricity generation and transmission. It is
only partial in water and sanitation, and electricity distribution since some of the poorest provinces
have yet to agree to the concession of these services. In terms of population coverage, privatized
utilities services are the norm for over 75 per cent of the population. Throughout the paper, we assume
that the changes observed in water and electricity distribution in Buenos Aires are representative of
developments for the whole country if 100 per cent of the population were connected to private
operators.2
variable levels (investments in particular) already reflect the results of the reform
process. This may also cause an under-evaluation of the utility reform contributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the sources of the fiscal
gains to be assessed. Section 3 discusses the database and the design of the social
accounting matrix. Section 4 presents the computable general equilibrium model and
summarizes the main simulations. Section 5 examines the relative importance of
international interest rate shocks for the utilities sector. Section 6 concludes.
2 What are the fiscal gains from reform?
The utilities reform created both direct and indirect fiscal gains that have significant
distributional consequences. There are three main types of direct fiscal gain: first, there
are proceeds to the government from the transfer of ownership to private operators, or
for the concession of public services. In Argentina, these were made either in cash or as
public sector bonds repurchased in the secondary market. Second, an increased taxbase
was generated by the transformation of service provision from the public to the private
sector, where these services are subject to value added tax (VATs) and income tax. The
third type of direct gain results from the elimination of operational subsidies paid to
public enterprises for intermediate inputs and salaries.
There are also several important sources of indirect gains. First, service obligations
imposed on private operators increase the level of public services available and improve
access in high cost areas—often serving poor users—that would otherwise need to be
subsidized by the public sector. These network expansions are, to some extent, self-
financing because of network externalities and scale effects, as well as because of the
tolerance for cross-subsidies generated within the sector. Second, fiscal revenue is
generated when the public sector manages to capture additional indirect taxes collected
by privatized firms acting as indirect collection agencies, a process that reduces evasion.
Evasion in value added tax is easier to control when all agents of the
payment/production chain are liable than when one of them is a tax-exempt public
provider. Finally, the reallocation of public expenditures resulting from the transfer of
some of the financial responsibilities to the private sector contributes to an improvement
in services in education, health, rural infrastructures—areas which otherwise would be
neglected. The transfer to private operators has also helped the government cover losses
from poor macroeconomic cycle years.
These dividends can be added to the gains primarily attributed to the reform of utilities
and their privatization or concession. Relying on the same basic general equilibrium
model, Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999) show that the productivity gains from
increased private sector participation are significant and tend to favour the poor,
particularly if efficiency gains were redistributed by the regulators throughout the
economy, avoiding their conversion into rent for the owners of private capital.
These direct and indirect gains did not develop in a vacuum, as Argentina’s external
financing conditions have changed since 1995. The tequila and vodka crises have
increased by about 2 per cent the cost of credit needed to finance the country’s deficit.3
This started a deceleration of the economy and a deterioration in the Argentinean
welfare levels that affects so many of the poor (Chisari et al. 1996). The 2 per cent
interest rate increase may have induced a GDP decline of more than 1 per cent annually
and a reduction of almost 2 per cent in welfare measured by the equivalent variation for
household revenue. The question is thus, To what extend has the combined impact of
these direct and indirect fiscal payoffs from privatization offset the adverse effect of
external shocks?
3 A general equilibrium model for Argentina
The first step in providing the answer to this question is to develop a Social Accounting
Matrix (SAM) of the economy to consistently combine and summarize the information
on major macroeconomic transactions. The SAM prepared here corresponds to the post-
privatization period. This was a challenge in itself as the changes in most economic
indicators have been quite dramatic and have resulted, at times, in a spectacular
reshuffling of data trends, a fact which increases the difficulty of creating a consistent
database. Indeed, this period is characterized by strong fluctuations in economic activity
and by price changes that are the severest ever observed in the country. Similarly,
unemployment levels by Argentina’s standards are relatively high.2
The matrix covers four types of markets—the domestic production and investment
market (for final and intermediate use), the investment goods market, the labour market
and the bonds (or credit) market. The firms range over 21 productive sectors, covering
both goods and services. The firms need labour and capital which are owned by the
households and the foreign sector. The public sector is a net demander of goods and
labour and offers bonds for amounts equivalent to the level of expenditures not covered
by tax revenue. The government demands sector-specific labour but can also recruit
from other sectors, as needed. Since the model is short term, there are rigidities in the
system. One of the rigidities adopted here is the constraint that private-sector workers
can transfer to the public sector but not vice-versa. Tables 1 and 2 show a summary of
the input-output matrix uses for the SAM and labour and capital sharing by type of
consumer.
Table 2 confirms the expectation of many researchers with regard to the distribution of
assets and factor income. As shown in the table, the richest income class stands to gain
the most from an unequal distribution of the quasi-rents generated by privatization
because about 90 per cent of the total economic capital is concentrated in the two
highest income groups.
A more technical and detailed description of the SAM is provided in Appendix A1.
2 Although unemployment in 1993 was 9.33 per cent, which was consistent with past levels, it has since
peaked at almost 20 per cent with some degree of fluctuation prevalent.4
Table 1
Summary input-output matrix uses for the SAM
(% of gross output value)
Agriculture Industry Infrastructure Construction Services
Agriculture 8.5 13.3 5.9 3.3 0.4
Industry 7.1 20.4 8.9 41.7 10.1
Infrastructure 0.1 2.2 18.4 0.4 1.6
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .0
Services 12.3 12.8 8.9 12.6 17.4
Imports 0.2 6.0 0.5 0.9 0.4
Value added 71.5 45.4 57.5 41.1 70.2
Output 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2
Distribution of factor income per income classes
Composition (as % of total class income) Shares (as % of total factor income)
Capital
Households Labour Physical Financial Transfers Labour Capital Total income
1 (poorest) 71.7 19.4 0.4 8.5 11.2 3.8 7.3
2 64.0 26.7 0.4 8.9 14.5 7.6 11.0
3 64.3 27.0 1.0 7.8 21.4 10.7 15.4
4 62.8 29.2 1.9 6.0 27.9 16.3 22.2
5 (richest) 28.9 61.0 5.7 4.4 25.0 61.5 44.1
Table 3
Development of the main indicators for privatized utilities









Efficiency gains: 17.2 5.5 25 7.0 10.9
Measured as the reduction in
intermediate purchases as share of
gross value added
Labour productivity gains: 17.4 31.5 13.4 -29.0 23.5
Measured as Gwh, cubic meter,
population served, lines in service
per employee
Changes in average real tariffs: 1 -38.1 -5.9 -0.5 11.1 -4.9
Changes in production scale: 36.3 19.7 15.7 14.4 39.4
Measured as investment as
share of initial capital
Note: 1 For water, they represent the changes in costs observed as a result of ‘privatization’. All
tariffs are deflated through a consumer price index.5
The data used to estimate these effects were collected from the annual reports of private
operators or public enterprises, from the General Public Enterprise Association
(Sindicatura General de Empresas Públicas, SIGEP) and from the regulatory agencies.
Changes in these variables, summarized in Table 3, are sufficiently consistent with
Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999) to allow comparisons. In this respect, the update to
reflect production and access levels as of 19993 is an improvement over the earlier
study.
Table 4 summarizes the fiscal revenue paid by operators in cash or bonds for the
concession. Funds accruing to the government from the utilities transfers were
equivalent to about 4 per cent of the 1994 GDP; 7 per cent for the rest of the
privatization transfers. Payments in bonds also enabled a more rational management of
the residual debt which certainly had a beneficial impact on the cost of debt servicing
for the country as reflected in the figures.
Table 4
Direct fiscal outcome of the privatization programme (1994 US$ million)
Debt withdrawal
Sector Cash Cash equivalency Nominal value Transferred debt Total
Telephones 2270.9 1257 5000 3527.9
Airlines 260.0 483 1610 743.0




Oil 5100.2 884 1271.1 5984.2
Gas 820.6 1541.1 3082.1 1110.0 3471.7
Fridges 1.9 1.9
Petrochemicals 55.7 28.4 133.6 84.1
Shipyards 59.8 59.8
Steel 143.3 22.1 41.8 165.4
Financial 86.3 86.3
Real estate 202.5 202.5
Others 15.0 2.4 17.4
Total 9933.9 6151.9 14923.1 18752.2
3 The tariffs presented here correspond to the regulated prices except in electricity generation where the
price is competitive. Tariffs used are those observed in the area of Gran Buenos Aires, based on the
assumption that they reflect the development across Argentina if all utilities were operated privately.
For electricity, gas and telecommunications, they correspond to the typical consumption level of
residential and commercial users.6
These indirect fiscal contributions are not the only important changes that could be
overlooked by a simple statistical review. Indeed, these are only a part of the fiscal
impact of reform. An assessment also needs to be made of the consequences of the
government’s decision to cut subsidies and to tax the new private operations. In
addition, the productivity improvements shown in Tables 3 also imply further efficiency
gains than those obvious on first inspection. Reductions in the use of intermediate goods
and factors of production represent significant potential gains for the economy in terms
of freeing resources for better allocation to other sectors.
In addition, these changes hide potential indirect distributional effects, which our
analysis may not pick up unless explicitly modelled to do so. For instance, the
government can also suffer losses if the affected dwindling sectors had been substantial
taxpayers. This, however, may be compensated by increased taxable profits driven by
cost reductions in the privatized sectors. The poor will be at a disadvantage if the
provision of public goods (e.g. education, health) is reduced, since they tend to benefit
proportionately more from these services. On the other hand, the poor will benefit as
costs and prices drop due to an increase in the scale of production. All this needs an
explicit modelling of the behaviour of the various agents represented in SAM, and of
the interactions of sector-specific reforms with the rest of the economy. This is why
developing a computable general equilibrium model enriches the analysis, showing
direct and indirect contributions of the reform to each of the liberalized sectors.
4 Main results and policy implications
The basic analytical structure of the model is summarized in Appendix A2. and is very
similar to that discussed in detail in Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999). This section
attempts to justify its use, to explain the minor changes adopted and to discuss the main
simulations conducted. The general equilibrium model is one of the most effective tools
to analytically isolate the various effects of reform. In particular, it can distinguish the
economic effects of improved productivity from the effects of increased access to
various services. This breakdown is needed to assess the changes in consumer welfare
and in public finances that result from the better management of public services by
private operators. We focus on three different scenarios to highlight the relative
importance of the main achievements of reform:
— First scenario assumes that operational productivity has not changed (i.e., it has
remained at the pre-reform level). It focuses on the effect of the increase in the
level of output in the privatized sectors;
— The second scenario assumes that operational productivity has improved, but
the scale of operation has not changed with respect to the public sector era.4
This scenario incorporates the effect of improvements in productivity and
quality and changes in tariffs (measured and indexed in dollars). Productivity
4 This exercise is similar to the one in Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999).7
gains are modelled by a reduction in the direct input coefficients of the
production functions;
— The third option computes the combined effects of the two changes; here it
may be useful to point out that the total of the results of the previous two
simulations may differ from the effects of the joint simulation due to the many
non-linearities or constraints in the specification of the model.
This section is divided in two parts. In the first one, we eliminate the consequences of
credit-market rationing of the 1990s, with the objective of isolating the effect of
privatization. In the second part, we introduce the effect of credit rationing in an effort
to assess the net impact of the economic reforms.
In addition to analysing these effects, it is also interesting to assess the relevance of the
regulation of private monopolies operating in the utilities services. The reliance on price
caps in many of the sectors has led to tariff levels which provide scope for rents for
operators who improve efficiency significantly. These rents are possible at least until
tariffs are reviewed by the regulator, and caps changed to redistribute the rents. But
regulation can also influence rents through its effects on the production scale. Many of
the regulated industries have high fixed costs with decreasing average costs for relevant
production levels. This suggests that we need to model explicitly the effects of
regulation: this can be done by comparing the results of the above-mentioned
simulations under the following two regimes:
· Good regulation: Prices of public services are fixed by the regulator at levels
prevailing in competitive markets that reflect the explicit balance of demand and
supply. Thus, this is equivalent to flexible prices operating under a regime which
prevents the capture of efficiency gains by the monopolies. Rents are thus
redistributed in the form of lower costs which, in turn, increase production levels
and demand for inputs, including labour.5
· Bad regulation: Tariffs are set at levels that allow monopoly owners to capture the
rent, thus ignoring the tariff levels established by competition for the market in
connection with concession contracts or licenses. Bad regulation increases fiscal
revenues from profit tax levied upon privatized utilities. But, these revenue increases
need to be balanced against the potential extra income from an expanded taxbase
that results from positive growth triggered by a more competitive economy.
The difference in economic performance under these two regimes highlights the value
of regulation and of the social cost of poorly supervised monopolies in these sectors.
An important aspect of good or bad regulation is the transfer of sector-specific
efficiency gains to the rest of the economy. If these gains are passed to the economy in
the form of lower prices, the rest of the economy is able to increase its scale of
operation which lowers unemployment, and to reallocate resources in order to maximize
5 We are not considering whether good or bad regulation was anticipated and whether it affected the
initial down-payment.8
welfare. However, under bad regulation, efficiency gains are rents which are not
transferred to the rest of the economy. These rents may not be a total loss, as they are
captured in the welfare levels of the shareholders.6 However, as the computation is
calculated on a short-term basis, we have avoided the problem of sunk costs and of
incentives to invest in these sectors. Therefore, the difference between good and bad
regulation cannot be associated just to the provision of incentives to the owners of the
privatized utilities; it is the transfer of scale and efficiency gains to the rest of the
economy. The difference between good and bad regulation is also related to income
distribution and to how these benefits are distributed among population quintiles and
used to finance consumption.
4.1 The pure effect of privatization without credit market rationing
Table 5 presents the effects of the simulations on the some of the main macroeconomic
indicators. The results are clearly of a short-term nature. Indeed, while the economic
agents include investment goods in their utility function, the capital is sector-specific: it
does not move across sectors nor can it influence short-term production. Bearing these
restrictions in mind, we focus on a few crucial macroeconomic indicators: GDP, industrial
GDP, a weighted rate-of-return per sector with the weights given by the sectoral GDP,
rate of investment, and the ratio of exports versus imports. The level of the
unemployment rate is presented in the table, but to be consistent with the rest of the
information presented, it needs to be compared to the 9.33 per cent rate observed at the
beginning of the period.
The large increases in investments since privatization have resulted in an overall growth
in economic activity. The gains are due in part to decreasing technical and non-technical
losses (reduced evasion, improved metering, etc.) and to reduced credit costs resulting
from improvements on the fiscal side. Fiscal recovery would, in particular, explain the
significant improvements in the rates of return to capital as well as in investment and
export rates. A comparison of the results under the two regulatory regimes shows that
all macroeconomic indicators improve under good regulation, particularly
unemployment, which is reduced. All sectors benefit from a competitive environment in
the utilities sector. The only indicator that improves with a deterioration of regulation is
investment, which suggests that firms tend to have the incentive to invest some of the
rents generated by an ineffective regulator. Most of these results are discussed in detail
in Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999) and hence the focus of the discussion here is on
the new results.
6 Some of the shareholders may not be domestic agents; consequently the effects on their welfare are
not included in the computations. This can make a difference also in the case of good regulation.9
Table 5
Macroeconomic effects of the utilities privatization














GDP 0.72 0.91 0.70 0.79 1.47 1.70
Industrial GDP -0.34 -0.04 0.16 0.66 -0.13 0.62
Rate of return to capital 0.13 0.55 1.60 1.68 1.63 2.23
Investment 0.45 0.30 1.08 0.71 1.41 1.01
Exports/imports -9.31 -7.86 -2.47 -2.52 -10.46 -5.34
Unemployment rate 8.38 7.62 9.55 8.91 9.00 7.32
Tradable outputs -0.33 0.11 0.08 0.48 -0.21 0.63
Non-tradable outputs 0.32 0.44 0.57 0.80 0.84 1.23
Tradable/non-tradable
prices -0.78 0.19 0.49 2.48 -0.27 2.67
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: The equivalent variation is measured in terms of total government revenue.
Table 6
Fiscal effects of the utilities privatization














Tax revenue/GDP 0.54 0.09 0.72 0.19 1.23 0.28
EV (1) for government 2.53 0.44 3.41 0.88 5.82 1.32
Source: Own calculations.
Note: The equivalent variation (EV) is measured in terms of total government revenue.
Table 6 focuses on the effects of privatization on the government fiscal stance in an
single year. One short-term gain is the immediate revenue generated by the privatization
process. This is reflected in stock adjustment, particularly in debt adjustment. The long-
term gains reflect the effect of changes in flows, in particular tax revenue flows, as well
as some revenues from minority shareholding in some of the privatized companies or
from bond holdings. Expenditures include purchases of goods and services, salaries,
transfers and debt service.
Table 6 shows somewhat unexpected results when comparing the fiscal effects under
good or bad regulation. The government benefits from bad regulation for two reasons.
When the regulator eliminates rents, it also eliminates tax revenues accruing from the
profits of strong monopolists. Moreover, good regulation increases export-oriented
output, which is subject to fewer indirect taxes, thus reducing the country’s taxbase.10
Table 7
Present net value of fiscal revenue
(as % of GDP)
Combined
Indicator Bad regulation Good regulation
Tax revenue/GDP 7.03 1.59
Note: Discount rate of 11.78% for 10 years.
Table 8














EV 1 (poorest) 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.9 2.0 3.1
EV 2 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 1.5 2.3
EV 3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.5 2.0
EV 4 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.8
EV 5 (richest) 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.5
IGI -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6
IGIN -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5
Source: Own calculations.
Note: The EV is measured in per cent of the revenue of each agent. IGI and IGIN stand for changes in
the Gini coefficient and the Gini coefficient corrected by public section implicit transfers,
respectively; a positive change in IGI or IGIN indicates an increase in income concentration.
Further government gains can be approximated by calculating an equivalent variation
from additional long-term revenue.7 The government has a choice between privatization
or tax reform which increases tax rates to achieve the same levels of revenue gains as
with privatization. With an equal-yield replacement8 (Shoven and Whalley 1992), the
adoption of tax reform under bad regulation implies a loss of well-being of US$ 988
million for all private agents. Under good regulation, the loss is reduced to US$ 211
million On the other hand, adoption of an infrastructure reform under a bad or good
regulatory regime implies gains in the magnitude of US$ 3,000 million and US$ 4,390
million, respectively.
7 The equivalent variation (EV) is the minimum amount that an individual gaining from a particular
reform is willing to accept to forgo the reform. For a potential loser from a change, EV is the
maximum he/she would be willing to pay to prevent the change from happening.
8 An equal-yield replacement is a conceptual exercise, which entails replacing a tax with another so that
the total government revenue is constant (in real terms).11
Table 7 estimates the accumulation of fiscal effects in the event that productivity
expansion can be sustained and that the increased access to services is permanent.9
Thus, based on the assumption that the 1999 debt level (11.78 per cent) is constant over
the next decade, the present value of fiscal gains would vary from 1.59 per cent of GDP
under good regulation to about 7 per cent under a bad regulatory regime. This means
that eventual income earnings of the government are greater than those obtained from
privatization transactions.
Table 8 summarizes the effects of reforms on private sector’s welfare. The well-being of
each agent is approximated by an equivalent variation expressed in terms of the income
of each of them. Income distribution is measured with a Gini index, which is adjusted to
include the effect of the availability of public goods and services on the distribution of
income.
Table 8 shows that the effects of scale and of productivity improve the welfare of all
income groups, and that the productivity effect dominates for all groups. Both factors
improve the distribution of income.10 This happens in spite of the increase in the
return-to-capital observed earlier, which essentially accrues only to the 5th quintile
(richest quintile). Nevertheless, the poorest quintile receives the greatest benefit from
infrastructure privatization, which is only one of the many reforms that took place in
Argentina in the 1990s. In fact, the simple Gini coefficient may underestimate the
distributional benefits of infrastructure reform. Indeed, the poor tend to benefit
relatively more from the government having additional resources available as a
consequence of reforms, if these additional resources are allocated to the provision of
goods and services the poor tend to use relatively more. Ahumada et al. (1994 for
Argentina) suggest that the Gini can be corrected by allocating total public expenditures
to each quintile. This implies that the gains to the poor resulting from increased access
are not limited to efficiency improvements. An alternative approach to assess the
distributional effects of the reform-generated public revenue is to adjust the measure of
the equivalent variation. So far, the equivalent variation computed here is private:
ni(p0,mi +V E i,g)=ni(p1,mi ,g),
where ni is the indirect utility, p0 and p1 are the initial and final prices, respectively, and
mi is the income of agent i, VEi is the equivalent variation of the agent and g is a
variable representing the rationing of the agents before (g0)a n da f t e r( g1) privatization.
While the adjusted Gini can already highlight some of the benefits derived from the
government’s additional resources, a more robust approach would factor in the
improvements in government revenue. Thus, this approach can be improved by
computing the EV with adjustments for the specific incidence of access to new goods
and services (health, education, housing) per quintiles. This results in a new corrected
indirect utility function:
9 We are assuming, in fact, that firms will continue to produce the same quantity over the next 10 years.
We do not need to assume any specific value for population (or geographical) coverage, just the same
quantity observed in 1999.
10 Negative values imply a smaller concentration of income as compared to the original situation.12
ni(p0,mi +V E i+ yi,g0)=ni(p1,mi ,g1),
where yi represents public spending (in education and health, for example) assigned to
household i, from the additional government income. Table 9, introducing the results,
shows that while both scale and productivity effects are relevant, productivity effects
dominate and that the payoffs from good regulation are even stronger than those given
in Table 8.
This table suggests that the incidence of good regulation is not only desirable, but also
strong enough to offset potential government arguments advocating weak regulation for
generating additional revenue. Indeed, in spite of lower fiscal revenues, a good regulator
is better able to target assistance to the poorest groups. This is confirmed by a quick
look at the EV measured in terms of household expenditures for utilities in each quintile
shown in Table 10.
Table 9














EV 1 (poorest) 2.51 2.95 2.98 3.78 3.82 4.94
EV 2 1.52 1.77 2.03 2.57 2.58 3.94
EV 3 1.39 1.54 1.90 2.22 2.41 2.92
EV 4 0.95 1.17 1.30 1.72 1.66 2.37
EV 5 (richest) 0.36 0.49 1.27 1.56 1.33 1.79
Source: Own calculations.
Table 10




















EV 1 (poorest) 341 50 188 28 529 78
EV 2 400 48 192 23 592 71
EV 3 556 55 182 18 738 73
EV 4 584 46 362 29 946 75
EV 5 (richest) 1119 63 465 26 1584 89
Total 3000 54 1390 25 4390 79
Note: The savings considered correspond to the annual EV in US dollars at 1993 value. The savings
for regulation are calculated as the difference between good and bad regulation. ‘Spending on
utilities’ are those gains as a per cent of total spending of the income bracket in ‘public’ services.13
As has been observed thus far, households and the government are potential
beneficiaries of reform. But reform also changes input prices and factor income which,
in turn, have an impact on sectoral production levels. As shown in Table 5, utilities
reform increases the level of activity in the economy as a whole. The main observation
of this simulation is that even though both tradable and non-tradable sectors tend to gain
from the privatization of utilities, the tradable sector tends to gain less than the non-
tradable when the regulation is good. However, in a bad regulatory regime, the tradable
sector loses, meaning that the competitiveness of the country deteriorates, thus eroding
the long-term sustainability of the reform process.
4.2 How much does an international interest rate shock hurt utilities users?
Since the utilities sectors often require high investments with long amortization periods,
tariffs tend to be very sensitive to changes in the cost of capital. Table 11 summarizes
the impact of a 2 per cent increase in international interest rates on the economy of
Argentina and on the users of utilities services, after the implementation of the utilities
reform and after all the efficiency gains were achieved.
The results remain consistent: with a better regulator, there is definite advantage for
Argentina as a whole. Negative effects from an interest rate shock extend to all income
groups, particularly the middle class. But the consequences on the poorest sectors of the
population can be alleviated with effective regulation. The main risk for the poorest and
the middle-income classes comes from the strong adverse impact on investment and
subsequently on employment. The current upsurge in Argentina’s unemployment rates
is, to a large extent, a possible reflection of the tequila and vodka shocks compounded
by the weakness of the internal financial market. From a distributional viewpoint, the
adjusted Gini shows that under bad regulation income distribution worsens, but it still
improves under good regulation.
Table 11
Effects of a 2% interest increase in the post-reform period
Effects under:
Indicators Bad regulation Good regulation
GDP 0.2 0.6
Industrial product -0.5 0.9
Investment/GDP -1.55 -2.14
Rate of unemployment (absolute value) 13.6 11.1
EV 1 -1.2 0.9
EV 2 -1.5 0.0
EV 3 -1.7 -0.7
EV 4 -2.0 -0.7




EV for government 4.9 1.1
Source: Own calculation. Changes in % with respect to baseyear.14
5 Conclusions
The general equilibrium approach adopted here has allowed to us to isolate the effects
of the utilities reform on the public and private sectors respectively and to examine the
distributional consequences of these effects. The main conclusions are that these
reforms are good for the income levels of the country, that reforms have improved the
fiscal situation of Argentina and have promoted, when capital markets have been stable,
the competitiveness of the country. Reforms have led to greater efficiency and equity,
but have created less fiscal revenue under a good regulatory regime than in a bad
regime.
It is also clear that a better understanding of the full fiscal effects of reform is crucial to
an assessment of its long-term sustainability. Since the public sector tends to gain in
many ways from reform, reversibility on purely fiscal grounds is unlikely. More
problematic is the weak incentive for governments worried about finances to adopt good
regulation because stronger rents in regulated sectors would translate into significant
additional revenue. Under good regulation, revenue gains in current net value are
equivalent about 0.28 per cent of GDP compared to 1.23 per cent under bad regulation.
The difference is significant, but still insufficient to compensate the welfare loss
imposed on consumers by bad regulation.
From a strictly distributional viewpoint, the conclusion emerging from the examination
of the achievements of the utilities reform is comforting. The poorest families can
benefit in the magnitude of US$ 341 million in equivalent variation, about 50 per cent
of their utilities bill. Globally, the EV for households is US$ 3,000 million or 54 per
cent of their expenditures on utilities. The poorest groups would tend to benefit the most
from improvements both in access and productivity.
The most pessimistic note comes from the fragility of the gains from the utilities reform.
Although many of the gains appear modest in comparison to the distress caused by the
interest shocks of the 1990s, they can help to soften the blow, particularly if good
regulation is in place. Unfortunately, this generally is not enough to counteract the blow.
Thus, to the answer the question introduced in the title of this paper as to whether the
gains from Argentina’s utilities reform can offset credit shocks, we must acknowledge
that those gains are not enough.Appendix Table A1
Summary SAM and economic features of the model for 1993
(in billion US$; 1993 GDP: US$256.329 billion)















































































· CES value added for private
firms;
· Leontief value added for
privatized firms;
· non-tradable prices are
market clearing for given
levels of rationing in factor
markets;
· combination with other goods
and services in fixed
proportions.
(132,370)
Spending on domestic goods:
· Cobb-Douglas utility in goods;
· Fixed proportion with goods
for retail trade;
· Separate quantity, price and




Spending on goods and services:
· Cobb-Douglas social welfare
function in purchases of
goods and service, bonds,
retirees services and
investment;
· Purchases of goods and







· Foreign consumer has
a Cobb-Douglas utility
in exports and imports;
· Bonds can be used to
pay for net imports;
· Argentina is a price
taker in exports and
imports;
· Surplus not consumed
in Argentina can be






















· Imperfect substitution with
domestic substitutes
(8,727)
Imports of capital goods:
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(22,461)













Labour income net of taxes:
· Initial unemployment
(60,786)
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A1 SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) for Argentina, 1993
This is the matrix used in Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999) and is summarized in
Appendix Table A1.
It may be helpful to summarize here the main assumptions we had to make.1 First, some
of the basic production data were not readily available for 1993 and we had to fill the
gaps with 1986 data, the last year for which detailed information was available. Second,
the matrix of intermediate purchases is based on the 1984 data adjusted to the values of
the 1993 national census. Third, the distribution of the factor income across income
groups is based on the distribution observed in the province of Buenos Aires in 1991.
Finally, the distribution of the consumption basket per type of goods and services is
based on the 1986 household consumption survey. In both the input and output matrix
and the household consumption, consistency for consumption and production with the
national accounts data was obtained by relying on the RAS method.2 As for the
governmental distribution between goods and services, data are available for 1993 for
the national and provincial governments. Municipal expenditures are assumed to be
distributed in the same proportion as the average for the two other government levels.
The infrastructure data are based on information on assets, inputs and expenditures
available in the annual balance sheets of the companies of the sector and
complementary data provided by the national regulatory entities and the sector
secretariats (energy, water resources, communications).
A2 The basic analytical structure of the general equilibrium model
The specific equations are detailed and explained for each agent.
A2.1Consumers






d(h), S(h), B(h), Cr(QC(h), p)]. (1)
It is modelled as a Cobb-Douglas between all goods except for retail trade, assumed to
be purchased in fixed proportions with the rest of the goods and services. The
preferences of domestic agents are assumed to follow an Armington specification which
1 Details on the data sources used to construct the accounts are provided in an appendix available from
the authors. This appendix explains the data-collecting procedure (this was a labour-intensive exercise
as we needed to visit all the privatized utilities to verify and complement the information given in
their annual balance sheets). The appendix also explains the various techniques used to check for the
consistency of the collected information and the robustness of the results.
2 See Bacharach (1970).18
implies no perfect substitutability in preferences between domestic and imported
goods.
3
Expenditures are distributed as follows:
· domestic consumption goods c
d, and investments I
d at price p,
· imported goods c
m at prices pm,
· ‘bonds’ services B at prices pb,a n d
goods and services of ‘privatized’ firms represented by an index Cr, combining the
quantity QC with quality p at price rC per unit of QC; a change in quality is not
necessarily associated with a change in the price of the service provided by the
privatized firm. Cr can follow a multiplicative form such as: Cr =Q C v(p /p
N)w h e r e p
N
is the normal quality level and v is a non-decreasing function of p /p
N. An increase in
service failures increases costs for the buyer of the services because the consumer needs
to buy a larger number of physical units to reach the desired flow of services. This
‘naive’ modelling approach allows, for instance, to model the costs of power losses or
interruptions as a share of unit costs.
In some simulations, prices are differentiated per income groups rC.




m(h) + (1+tir)r C Cr(h)+ pbB(h) (2)
=[ w S ( h )+w gSg(h) + q(h)(rpKpo +r pKpxo +N
p+N
px )
+ qr(h) (rrKro +N
r )] (1-td)+p bB
o(h)+ pR R
o.
The family pays indirect taxes at rates ti and tir, depending on the type of good and
service, and direct taxes td and taxes on imports tm. Its income sources are labour
income in the private sector S at salary w, in the public sector Sg with salary wg and
capital Kpo in private firms remunerated at rate rp; revenue from profits on domestic
sales N
p and sales abroad N
px and revenue from participation in the privatized firm N
r in
proportion to the shares owned, indicated as qr; qralso represents the participation of the
income group in each sector specific capital rpKp,r pKpxo and rrKr . In the scenario in
which capital is specific, the profit rates enter fully rp or rr .B
o represents holdings of
private sector bonds. The initial ‘holdings are negative if the consumption group is a net
debtor in the benchmark simulation; in this case, an increase in pb probably results in an
increase in the supply of labour and a reduction in the expenditures of the quintile.
Families also get public sector transfers represented as the purchase by the government
of a service with an inelastic supply, R
o at price pR.
3 Although not necessary to ensure that the economy does not become specialized, by assumption the
capital earmarked to the tradable sectors cannot be reallocated.19
A2.2Private firms
Private firms are those for which there was no change in ownership.4 They produce
goods and services intended for intermediate and final consumption as well as for
export and investment. This differentiation is necessary in order to be able to properly
account for differences in the tax treatment of various production destinations (for
instance, exporters do not pay VAT and benefit from discounts on gross income tax).
However, there is no technological differentiation across these sectors. In other words,
the production function used for a specific product (say food) at different stages of the
production process (intermediate, final or exports) is the same.
Exporters of goods are price-takers abroad and exports of services are price inelastic
(i.e., they are constant). Non-tradable prices are determined as solution variables and
adjust with factor income until markets are in equilibrium.
The profit function for a private firm can thus be written as:
N
p =[ p-a p b - apE(zrE+(1-z)rC)- f(1+ti)-f m(1+tm)pm]Q
p -w L p(1+tv1)-r pKp(1+tv2), (3)
and for exporters, it can be adjusted as:
N
px =[ p x -a p b -ap(zrE+(1-z)rC) - f(1+ti)- f m (1+tm)pm]X
p -( w L px +r pKpx). (4)
where parameter a is the credit requirements per unit of output, while ap represents the
quantity of services provided by the privatized company to obtain a unit of output.
Moreover, 1-z indicates the share of privatized services requirements per unit of output
purchased through distribution companies at price rC, while z is the share purchased on
the wholesale market at prices rE. Purchases of electricity in the wholesale market
correspond to generation, purchases on the retail market correspond to distribution.5
The inter-industrial transactions in these simplified expressions are represented by a
coefficient f for national goods and fm for imported intermediate inputs. These
requirements are proportional to total production Q
p, and to exports X
p, respectively.
Privatized goods and services are also proportional to output which is different from the
assumption made for consumers where rationing could take place. However, firms can
be subject to adjustment in quality of services just as consumers and hence can face
differences in cost for the same service.6 An improvement in service quality is
represented by a reduction in parameter a,i . e .
a'( ) < 0.
4 The former public oil company, YPF, was, however, considered a private firm.
5 While the model projects no substitutability between the two types of inputs, some evidence in other
countries suggests that this may be a strong assumption (see Seitz 1994).
6 This is based on the assumption that there is no possibility of using ‘home-made’ substitutes for
infrastructure services.20
If {A}nxn is the input-output matrix, this quality improvement is measured indirectly
through its effect on the increase in productivity of the input requirements.7
Remuneration rp includes total payments to capital and hence amortization. Saving and
investment decisions are taken by households. The tax tv1 corresponds to VAT and to
labour taxes collected at the firm level while tv2 corresponds to similar taxes on capital.
To simplify, taxes on labour and capital levied on exports are not included here, even if
this is done more accurately in the model.
The product combines intermediate inputs and value added in fixed proportions. The
value added itself is obtained by combining labour and capital inputs in a CES
production:




where k is the elasticity of substitution of labour and capital while the bi are distribution
parameters used in the calibration of the model.
For exports, the value-added function is similar:
VApx =F ( L px,Kpx). (6)
More generally, the product of sector j, QTpj, is obtained from a fixed coefficient
function (Leontief) between intermediate consumption and value added:
QTpj = mín {Q1j/a1j,...,Qnj/anj,V A pj/avj }( 7 )
where Qij is the quantity consumed of good i for producing j.
A2.3Privatized utilities
The privatized firms sell mostly to the domestic market. With the exception of some
differentiation due to regulation, service obligations or to taxes according to their final
users, each utility sector is assumed to sell a single product. Their profit function
includes any subsidy TG that could be transferred by the public sector and is written as:
N
r =r CQC +r EQE +r GQG -[ a
rpb + a r(zrE+(1-z)rC)( 8 )
+ f(1+ti)+f m (1+tm)pm](QC+QE+QG)- w L r(1+tv1)-r rKr(1+tv2)+T G,
where QC is the quantity of product sold to households at a unit price rC,Q E corresponds
to the goods and services sold to the firms at price rE y the index G is used for the public
sector wherever a distinction is relevant. This also allows a differentiation of tariffs into
retail, wholesale or commercial and residential as necessary. The quality variables are
modelled as an improvement in the overall efficiency of the sector and TG is modelled
7 The actual modeling of the quality variable is discussed in section 4 in connection with the modeling
of the effects of private operations.21
as a subsidy to capital set to zero or to shrink to zero as spelled in the privatization
documents.8
It is important to note that all outputs are limited by capacity and transmission
constraints incorporated through the value added function. The product of the privatized
sector is also based on a fixed proportion production function:
Qri = mín {Q1i/a1r...,Qni/anr VAri/avri }, (9)
where aji is the input requirement of j by firm i.








This description of the technology of the private and privatized firms was used to model
the changes in productivity, efficiency and quality.
Price regulation is modelled as RPI- X, where X is set to 0 at the beginning of the
contract. This implies that the rC is:
rC/rC




where P is the price vector of private and privatized domestic goods composing the
Laspeyres-index of retail prices in the based year with weights given by Q
Oand where b
is a correction coefficient for the tariffs (with b =1 in the benchmark scenario).
A2.4The public sector
The government maximizes a social welfare y including current collective goods H
produced with goods and services purchased G, Gr, employment Lg, bonds Bg (which
can be sold domestically or internationally), retirees services R, and a proxy for future
collective goods Ig, public investment:
y = y[H(G,Gr,Lg), Bg,R ,I g]. (12)
The function y(.) is a Cobb-Douglas and H(.) is a Leontief in G, Lg and Gr which
includes all the privatized services in fixed proportions. Pensions, bond services,
8 TG is used as an adjustment variable (a ‘fine tuning’ variable) to ensure that the rate of return in the
regulated sector continues to be consistent with the rate of return observed in the rest of the economy.
While this is an income transfer, it does not generate significant distortions. First, the transfer goes to
sector-specific capital and hence there is no reallocation across sectors. Second, while the transfers go
to the highest income group, their effect is offset by the reduction in other public expenditures within
the same income group. Third, the amounts involved are quite small in comparison to the total public
resources to be allocated.22
investments, and current operative expenses are a constant proportion of total
government income in this model.
The government faces a budget constraint given by:
ti[f(pQ + pxX) + pI
d +pc
d]+t v1 w(Lp+Lr )+ tv2(rpKp+rrKr) + (13)
tmpmfm(Q+X)+ tmpmc








=p ( G+I g)+r G Gr +w gLg +p bBg +p RR+T G .
In this equation, ag is the participation of the public sector in the ownership of capital of
the ‘privatized’ utilities. This is an important parameter since through ag,t h e
government is able to share monopoly rents.
A2.5The rest of the world






subject to the following constraints,
pmM-z
*V
d = 0, (15)
for imports M, produced with a single factor V





x = 0, (16)
for exports X, where V
x is the quantity of the foreign factor needed to produce X
s,a
perfect substitute to Argentina’s exports.
This foreign consumer faces the following budget constraint:
pxX
c +p mM






r ) , (17)
i.e. his revenue comes from payments to V, from its share of capital in the privatized
sector and from bonds and his expenditures are X
c in the exports markets and M
c in the
imports markets.
Equation 18 sets the export prices at the international level:
px X
a - pX = 0. (18)
Considering that Am and Ax are the foreign technological parameters, (19) and (20)








Constraint (219 describes the imbalance in the labour market and in the model is
replaced by equation (22) determining the salary in the private sector of the economy.
The labour market for the public sector clears as shown by (23) accounting for the fact
that Sg is an observation:
Lp +L px +L r < or = S, (21)
w=bw
* , (22)
Lg =S g. (23)
Parameter b is calibrated for the equilibrium salary in the economy, so that the initial
unemployment rate is equal to the observed unemployment rate; this value of b is then
kept constant throughout the counterfactual exercises.
A2.7Investment goods industries
Investment goods industries were divided into two main categories: those providing
capital goods for private firms and those that construct specific capital for each one of
the privatized utilities (electricity, gas, water and telecommunication). This procedure
allows the recognition of the differential impact of investment schedules established by
the regulatory contracts, for example, as network expansion commitments on the
economy (mainly on the rate of unemployment and the trade balance); therefore, special
effort was devoted to determine the input composition of each industry. The model has
not been fully exploited in this sense. For example, investment in water and sanitation
has not been simulated and yet they represent the major gains of privatization.
A2.8The market for ‘bonds’
The financial market is highly simplified in this model in contrast to the complexity of
Argentina’s financial sector. As already mentioned, there are fixed requirements of
credit per unit of output in each production sector, including the recently privatized
utilities. Additionally, domestic consumers can be separated into net debtors (typically
the four poorest income brackets, to meet their demand for durable goods) and net
creditors (the fifth income bracket); the rest of the world was also considered a net
creditor for the benchmark. In terms of the bonds market, debtors were represented as
issuers and creditors as subscribers. Therefore, for domestic families and for foreign
consumers, bonds were introduced in the model giving them initial endowments but
also introducing preferences for bond holdings as arguments in their utility functions.9
9 The information on sectoral and personal net financial positions was obtained from financial
authorities and estimated using purchases of durable goods and total capital holdings.24
The market for bonds is therefore represented as:
B(h) + Bg +B x +a ( Q p +X p +I p)+a r (QC +Q E +Q G) (24)
=B o(h) + Bog +B ox.
The information on sectoral and personal net financial positions was obtained from
monetary authorities and estimated using purchases of durable goods and total capital
holdings.
The domestic bonds market adjusts to the internal credit disequilibria of the families and
of the government and to Argentina’s disequilibrium with the rest of the world.
Internally, the first four quintiles sell ‘bonds’ (which is basically a credit instrument) to
the richest. A net increase in the demand for bonds thus reduces the purchasing power
of the four poorest income groups. An increase in the price of bonds is compensated by
a decline in the purchase of other goods and with an increase in the labour supply which
can contribute to an in increase in unemployment. The firms also demand bonds as a
fixed proportion of their value added. For them, an increase in the price of bonds
implies a cut in the marginal product of labour; which in turns leads to a reduction in the
demand for labour, adding to the unemployment problem.
Note that because the simulations of the model include both a positive unemployment
level and a commercial deficit, in addition to a disequilibrium in the labour market, the
rest of the world is financing consumption and domestic investment. For the bond
market, this means an increase in the demand for bonds issued by domestic agents and
purchased by foreigners. With an increase in the international interest rate, as in the case
of the tequila effect, foreign investors stop buying domestic bonds.10
10 In the two-year period from October 1993 and October 1995, the LIBOR jumped from 3.4 per cent to
5.8 per cent and the PRIME from 6 per cent to 7.8 per cent, while the domestic interest rate increased
from 9 per cent in October 1993 to 14 per cent in November 1994 and over 33 per cent in March
1995. Simultaneously, unemployment increased from 9.3 per cent to 12.2 per cent and the share of
problem bad debt portfolio over total portfolio increased to over 10 per cent in the 3rd quarter of 1994
and to over 30 per cent in the 2nd quarter of 1995. This fact was used in the calibration of the model.25
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